Cases
|
Value
Management Profile: Telecommunications Co.
A large
telecommunications firm had implemented a value management program
two years earlier, and now wanted to review how well the program
was working for them.
"We got a lot of hay
out of the program when we rolled it out two years ago, but I'm
not sure we've kept our focus since then. Maybe it's time for
some additional training," their CFO said, indicating a clear
readiness to spend significant sums in this area.
Managers were interviewed
across all functions and divisions, and at several levels in the
organization. Over 40 managers contributed to a clear picture
of their company's current management processes. They provided
vivid examples of behavioral and methodological changes over the
last two years. They shared where their program had made a difference
in their work, and they were candid about the perceived pitfalls
of the program. The verdict was generally positive, but experiences
were notably uneven across units.
We specifically inquired into
the potential benefits of additional training. "We're very
busy with new initiatives," reported several marketing managers.
"We have enough opportunity to learn about EVA (their main
measure). Our training center has regular classes on it, which
would be useful, except that my boss is still asking me about
NOI. So, what's the point?" It turned out that even though
EVA was a basis for funding corporate bonuses, NOI was
the basis for distributing bonus dollars among the marketing
units. In other words, where bonuses were not felt to be greatly
impacted by knowledge of EVA, the motivation to learn about EVA
was weak. No amount of spending on training would change that.
Our interviews with network
operations managers revealed a very different story. Their bonuses
were funded and distributed based on EVA. "EVA
dragged our engineers into the process of value creation, said
their COO. "This is the first year in our history where our
capital spending will not exceed depreciation. We're working much
smarter now, always seeking better ways of using our capital."
Was the measure too complicated? "Hey, we're tech heads.
And that's where our money is coming from." In other words,
where the bonuses were perceived to be based substantially on
EVA, further spending on training was hardly necessary.
After ten weeks of interviews,
we presented our findings to their executive committee. The final
report described their planning, decision-making, and reporting
relative to what their managers had experienced (a) prior to their
implementation of VBM, (b) relative to their expectations, and
(c) relative to best practices and what our experience suggested
was possible. We concluded that significant new spending on training
would be wasted without changes in their measurement and incentives.
Their top management thanked
us for comprehensive and well-organized findings and actionable
recommendations, but they expressed special appreciation for the
patience with which we approached their vast organization, and
for the great trust we were able to engender from their people,
made plain by the candor of our report

Value
Management Profile: Information Services
Co.
A
major financial information
service had been managing
their company and its divisions under a VBM program they had implemented
three years earlier. Although they felt that the program had helped
them significantly, they wanted to understand where it was helping
them most, and where they were losing out on potential benefits.
They were considering strengthening their incentive program, but
a peculiar issue had arisen for them in the third year which complicated
this wish.
"In our first two years,
our stock price went up along with our EP (economic profit). But
last year, our EP rose while our stock price dropped. That kind
of divergence produces bonuses that are difficult to justify to
our Board. Before we can make any other changes to our plan, we
need to understand what happened, and make sure we're doing everything
right."
We interviewed over thirty
of their managers across all their divisions and various levels
of management. We found that their VBM program was, in fact, creating
significant operating and strategic benefits. They had an acquisitive
history, and their pace of acquisitions had barely fallen off
under VBM. But both corporate and the divisions agreed that capital
budgeting and spending was now being conducted with greater discipline
and confidence.
At the same time, we analyzed
their corporate EP results and stock price performance. We found
that EP growth reflected stronger operating profits, but did not
account for a recent spike in interest rates. Since their stock
was sensitive to interest rates, it had dropped. Our recommendation
on this issue, which the client adopted, was to leave their measure
alone. Modifying their measure to account for interest rate effects
would (a) complicate the measure, and (b) penalize (or reward)
managers for a factor that, though it clearly affected stock price,
was also clearly out of their control. They agreed that the anomalous
results of the prior year could be explained to the board on the
rare occasions when it may arise.
With our findings and recommendations
in hand, they subsequently modified their incentive plans, with
Board approval, and took their operating and their stock price
performance to the next level.
|
| |
VBM Implementation:
Public Apparel Company
Can
a shoe company create a VBM program to cover their licensed and
house brands, international outsourcing and domestic manufacturing,
company-owned stores and distribution through chain and specialty
retailers?
The CFO warned us at the outset:
"We've signed up for this program. I'm a believer. But a
lot of people here remain to be sold. They each have their particular
way of operating, and some have been very successful and well
paid under the existing compensation plan."
We mapped out the full implementation
plan, formed a working group and steering committee, and got to
work. We began with training of a broad group of internal finance
and planning managers on the outline of the program, with some
details of how their various management processes would be modified.
Thus began the transfer of technology that would create internal
experts who could work with us and make the program their own.
Over eight months, we defined
a new measure for each of their many business units, developed
decision support models for their most common types of investment,
and designed a new incentive plan covering most of their managers.
We were then prepared to get final approval from their executive
committee, who had been briefed monthly on the progress, and their
Board, who had to approve the plan.
"What was wrong with
the old plan? Will we be paying our people enough? Will we be
paying them too much? Will we be paying them for the right things?"
These were questions the Board had asked at the time the project
was approved nine months earlier. Now they were getting their
answers with simulations of how the bonus plans would pay out
under different scenarios. Even after they approved the changes,
there was some anxiety among certain Board members.
Their anxiety was short lived.
Within days of the announcement of the new plan in early 1999,
the share price jumped nearly twenty percent. It has tripled since
then.

VBM Implementation:
Private Textile Company
A focus on shareholder
value isn't only for publicly traded companies. Some of VBM's
greatest success stories are with private companies.
"I don't want to be the
only person around here thinking about the owners," said
one CFO when he introduced his company to us. He was the trusted
"outsider" to the family that owned and ran the company.
"I want a solid business structure in place for the next
generation, and a focused team working for them."
Most of the managers had been
with the company for a very long time. During the implementation,
we patiently brought them along step by step, listening to and
addressing each of their concerns. The entire implementation process
took us across four countries over nine months.
At dinner in an Irish castle,
the division president in that country shared his concern that
the peculiar conditions of his market meant that a plan as simple
and objective as ours would not earn him any bonus next year.
We had a choice of complicating the plan to account for his market
conditions, or having him trust that over a couple of years, the
market peculiarities would get played out, and he would get the
reward he earned. By the time we were done with coffee, he was
satisfied that the multi-year structure of the plan was sound,
and he was willing to count on the owner to let the plan work
as it was designed, i.e., as a fixed interest in his division's
results over time.
Since each division manager
was a longtime colleague and friend of the owner, they were each
given the choice of whether or not to ultimately adopt the compensation
element of the program we had prepared for them. Five of the six
divisions took on the new plan, including the Irish division.
Eventually, seeing how the
plan had worked for the rest of the company, the sixth division
adopted the incentive plan as well. And the Irish division's belief
in their owner and themselves was well rewarded.

|
|
Valuation
and Strategy: Consumer Goods Company
The
owners of a southern consumer goods company wanted to better integrate
value-based management into its planning.
"We've got the motivation
to create value. We need to see if our plans will actually result
in value creation," was how their CEO introduced our task.
We began with a valuation
of their four business units. From these, we were able to determine
the aggregate growth in economic profit (EP)that would be required
to justify those valuations. We then reviewed EP projections from
their long-term plans, which combined projected growth in their
current operations with the value of projected acquisitions.
Two of their business units
showed more than adequate EP growth in their planning. These units
were then sent off to specify resource requirements, risks and
contingencies for their major initiatives. One unit that showed
barely adequate growth to justify its value was sent back to develop
stretch targets.
When acquisition opportunities
for any of the divisions were evaluated, they were especially
careful to pursue them only to the extent that the additional
returns from the combined entity would actually exceed the cost
of capital used in the purchase. Over
the next two years, two acquisitions plus operating improvements
from investment in distribution capabilities enabled the company
to realize the value in their plan.
The fourth business unit projected
inadequate EP growth. It was instructed to review its plans to
see how it could make up the shortfall, including alternative
operating scenarios and sale of unproductive assets and operations.
At the same time, since the excess valuation implied that the
unit may be worth more if sold than operated, senior management
began investigating divestiture opportunities.
Later that year, when a strategic
buyer made a strong offer, the company was already positioned
to quickly evaluate and accept it. Thus, they realized far more
value from that underperforming unit than they could have under
any operating scenario they had developed. They probably also
saved many jobs in that unit that might have been lost if it ended
up operating in the red and eventually getting shut down.

|
Valuation
and Strategy: Consumer Goods Company
The
owners of a southern consumer goods company wanted to better integrate
value-based management into its planning.
"We've got the motivation
to create value. We need to see if our plans will actually result
in value creation," was how their CEO introduced our task.
We began with a valuation
of their four business units. From these, we were able to determine
the aggregate growth in economic profit (EP)that would be required
to justify those valuations. We then reviewed EP projections from
their long-term plans, which combined projected growth in their
current operations with the value of projected acquisitions.
Two of their business units
showed more than adequate EP growth in their planning. These units
were then sent off to specify resource requirements, risks and
contingencies for their major initiatives. One unit that showed
barely adequate growth to justify its value was sent back to develop
stretch targets.
When acquisition opportunities
for any of the divisions were evaluated, they were especially
careful to pursue them only to the extent that the additional
returns from the combined entity would actually exceed the cost
of capital used in the purchase. Over
the next two years, two acquisitions plus operating improvements
from investment in distribution capabilities enabled the company
to realize the value in their plan.
The fourth business unit projected
inadequate EP growth. It was instructed to review its plans to
see how it could make up the shortfall, including alternative
operating scenarios and sale of unproductive assets and operations.
At the same time, since the excess valuation implied that the
unit may be worth more if sold than operated, senior management
began investigating divestiture opportunities.
Later that year, when a strategic
buyer made a strong offer, the company was already positioned
to quickly evaluate and accept it. Thus, they realized far more
value from that underperforming unit than they could have under
any operating scenario they had developed. They probably also
saved many jobs in that unit that might have been lost if it ended
up operating in the red and eventually getting shut down.

|
|
VBM
Preview For Top Managers:
Building Materials Co.
A building
materials fabrication and distribution company with operations
stretched across North America was interested in a long-term incentive
plan for their managers, but was intrigued by going the next step
into a full VBM program. Before committing to a major implementation,
however, they chose to have us review their business so we could
describe what VBM would look like for them.
We gathered reports, business
plans, and records of their existing compensation programs. We
also conducted interviews with senior managers of each of their
divisions. These interviews were helpful in three ways: (1) as
a source of information for us about their current operating and
management practices; (2) as a chance to answer specific questions
regarding VBM in a one-on-one setting; and, (3) as a safe place
for their key managers to air their concerns about implementation.
The interviews were individual (by business unit) and confidential
(even from the CEO, per his agreement) to assure that we had everything
needed to be able to report on potential constraints as well as
benefits in an implementation.
We shared our findings before
the entire senior management team in a full-day presentation,
including nearly two hours of Q&A. Before the presentation,
we were warned that the management team would need up to several
weeks to decide whether to go forward with an implementation.
That was all right with us since it was winter and most of their
operations were in Canada. However, as soon as the discussion
was completed, and all their questions had been answered, they
felt ready to vote then and there to go ahead with a full implementation.
Consultants learn from their
clients, too. We learned that complete disclosure--the good, the
bad, and the ugly--provide a great deal of comfort to managers
facing the unknown (i.e., what are these guys going to do to our
compensation?). We also learned that the southernmost parts of
Canada are still north of northern Minnesota, if you can imagine
how cold that gets.

|
|
Value
Measures Revealed:
Aerospace Company
An
aerospace company decided to fly us in for a meeting with their
financial managers from over thirty business units, to discuss
value-based metrics in the context of their divisions. Defense
companies have an array of peculiar measurement issues. Much of
their plant and equipment is related to R&D, some of which
is client funded. They have special accounting rules for percentage-of-completion
contracts with the government. They have multiple business lines
with varying degrees of collateral revenues and costs across them.
The first day of our training
program was devoted to general principles of value metrics applying
three key distinctions. First, we distinguished managerial accounting
for internal reporting and decision support from financial accounting
for external reporting and compliance. The client saw areas where
they were using external financial reports for internal managerial
decision-making to their obvious detriment. Second, we made the
distinction between measurement of business unit value added using
reporting on their activities versus measuring of business unit
contribution to corporate value added. The latter required reviewing
how well transfer prices actually tracked the transfer of value
between business units, and how cross-BU cooperation impacted
the value of the company. Third, we made the distinction between
accounting for reporting purposes versus measurement for compensation
purposes. We illustrated how these had to be related to maintain
a link between performance and pay without encouraging a short-term
focus or a bias toward disinvestment. We sent them away with homework
the first night to consider specific issues that arose for them
in their respective business units as a result of these distinctions.
The second day included a
discussion of many division-specific issues with several breakout
sessions and lots of Q&A. By the end of the program, the client
had learned from and contributed to a thorough, practical discussion
of how value metrics would be applied in their company, how their
company would significantly benefit by using those metrics, and
the cost in time and energy required to make the necessary changes
and to train their people accordingly.
This two-day seminar made
a huge difference in their eventual implementation of VBM into
their measurement, decision making, and compensation, and in the
wide dispersal of knowledge that would facilitate later training
of their business units.

|
|
EVA® is a registered
trademark of Stern Stewart & Co.
|
Copyright © 2003, Hodak Value Advisors
|